Time is running out, and if the numerous articles about Landa and the current options are accurate, FIMI has given an $80 million offer, and HP is still considering. So what are the realistic options from here?

Let’s speculate:

The court can still say no. If FIMI is rejected and no other offers come, Landa goes bust. If HP outbids FIMI but is also rejected, Landa goes bust. If the court extends time to find a realistic offer, with what money? Courts are not sentimental. Their job is to secure the creditors as much as possible. If offers don’t make sense, liquidation is always on the table.

If FIMI’s bid is accepted, that opens several options: they run with the money they have, hoping to survive; they look for more investors; they chop Landa up and sell in pieces – buildings, patents, machines, contracts; or they act as strawmen for someone else who doesn’t want to be seen in the dirty part of the deal.

One of the recurring questions during court meetings has been whether the investors withdraw from Landa Digital Printing.

After more than a decade of strategic partnership with Landa Digital Printing (LDP), ALTANA has decided to withdraw from further financing of the company. This decision was not made lightly, as we have not only provided financial support since 2014 but also worked closely with the LDP team. In doing so, we contributed our experience with solutions for the printing industry.

Our commitment of over ten years reflects the long-term perseverance often required for disruptive innovations like those developed by LDP. Investing in promising technology companies and start-ups remains a key part of our strategy. We will continue to avoid being guided by short-term fluctuations.

In the case of LDP, a combination of several factors has led to the conclusion that no positive business development can be expected in the foreseeable future.

Holger Elfes, Altana

Pay attention in particular to the last sentences. ‘It’s a combination of several factors,’ of which we can only guess, that has led to their conclusion, which must for any potential investor be a slam in the stomach “…that no positive business development can be expected in the foreseeable future.” So FIMI has, in one to two months, been able to identify potentials that Altana hasn’t been able to in ten years - whau.

But even here, the questions pile up. FIMI has no print experience. They inherit staff that already failed to complete the current Landa platform, and many of those staff are told to be VERY expensive by industry standards. FIMI will have to rely on suppliers who have just been slashed heavily. Will they play along? And why should customers trust a fresh “startup” at $3–4 million per machine when betting on Landa was already high-risk? Private equity isn’t charity. If there’s no fast turnaround, they sell maybe even quicker than people expect.

If HP steps in and wins the bid, things get more interesting.

HP could restructure Landa and integrate R&D. They could consolidate Indigo and Landa into one new “Indigo” platform, with nanography solving Indigo’s speed and substrate limitations. They could fold PageWide into a new Israeli hub, consolidating its industrial print operations under one roof. But let’s not be naïve. HP is not going to pay a premium here. They recognize the value lies in IP, patents, and possibly some individuals. And HP has no incentive to overpay when they can wait and cherry-pick from a bankruptcy fire-sale.

Other buyers shouldn’t be ruled out.

Komori, once a partner, might see value in salvaging patents or talent. Fujifilm, Ricoh, Canon, and Konica Minolta all have inkjet ambitions and may see a chance to buy IP and block competitors. Chinese players, such as HanGlory and Atexco, could view this as a shortcut to Western-level IP – although Israeli regulators might block it. Suppliers like Komori, Adphos, Fiery, BW Papersystems, and Harrison Bruno – all heavily exposed – could push for joint control or acquisitions to protect their sunk costs. Or they buy specific patents to prevent them from falling into a competitor’s hands.

Then there are employee-driven options.

A management buy-out? Financing may be nearly impossible at this stage. More likely is a talent exodus. The real risk for any buyer is that once the facade crumbles, the best engineers scatter. Then you’re left with patents and a shell. Customers are another forgotten stakeholder. It’s astonishing how little is said about the customers who bought Landa presses. High energy costs, uncertainty, specialized operators – how long will they keep running machines with no guaranteed service or future? Some owners have already laid off staff. Others will mothball machines if support collapses. Here, another option could be a service carve-out: a third-party stepping in to handle spares/maintenance without touching the R&D/IP. That way, the field lingers on, but the tech itself dies.

Political and regional risks can’t be ignored either.

War and instability in Israel may make foreign buyers hesitate. Some governments may pressure for “friendly” ownership (HP, Fujifilm) to keep Israeli IP out of “unfriendly” hands.

The harsh financial reality is that FIMI’s $80m may just be a “stalking horse” to get the process moving. Hidden liabilities – lawsuits, warranty claims, supplier contracts – could wipe out that value quickly. If creditors recover less than 10 cents on the dollar, and secured lenders and lawyers get first pickings, a judge may well decide liquidation is the only way forward.

So, where does this leave us?

I see three realistic paths: scrap and sell – buildings, patents, machines – the quick profit scenario for FIMI or anyone else; HP integration – if the price is right, HP uses nanography to leapfrog Indigo’s weaknesses; or the strawman route – FIMI does the dirty job, clears debts, and later hands it over to HP, Fujifilm, Komori, whoever. Everyone smiles for the cameras. Everything else? Mostly noise. And then one last uncomfortable truth: sometimes acquisitions are made just to kill technology. Would HP or another OEM pay $100m to bury nanography forever? Don’t rule it out.

It’s been only a few years since Landa considered going public at a $2 billion valuation. Today, the court will be lucky to approve a deal that secures 10 cents on the dollar for creditors. That is how far the mighty have fallen.

Soon we will know. Exciting times – unless you’re a creditor, a supplier, or a customer running one of those presses.